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MASS CRIMES ADJUDICATION IN INDONESIA: LEARNING FROM THE 
CAMBODIAN EXAMPLE 
 
Renée Harrison* 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Indonesia is a new democracy.1 There have been obvious successes 
in the struggle to transition to this form of government.2 Indonesia has 
even been used as a shining example of democracy for other Southeast 
Asian countries like Thailand and Myanmar that struggle to institute 
more democratic principles into their existing governments.3 Indonesia 
has also been called “Southeast Asia’s most democratic nation.” 4 
Notwithstanding all of these material successes, Indonesia has had a long 
history of serious human rights violations that sorely need investigation 
and prosecution.5 
Arguably, the events that most need attention are a series of human 
rights violations that occurred from 1965–66, mostly perpetrated against 
those affiliated with the Communist party. The number of people who 
were killed remains in dispute, although estimates range from five 
hundred thousand to over a million.6 As many as 1.7 million people were 
detained, and many others were tortured, beaten, and raped.7 The Central 
Intelligence Agency reported it as one of the worst mass murders in the 
twentieth century.8 Even though these events occurred almost fifty years 																																								 																					
* J.D. Candidate 2016, Brigham Young University Law School, Provo, Utah. The author would 
like to thank Professor Eric Jensen for his helpful insight and direction through the writing process.   
1 In 1998, Indonesia transitioned from an authoritarian regime under President Suharto to a 
“new democratic dispensation.” See Edward Aspinall, The Irony of Success, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 20, 
20–22 (2010) (outlining Indonesia’s democratic transition). 
2 Id. at 20 (listing the decline of military political control, the resolution of peace in Aceh, the 
expansion of civil liberties, and the freely contested multiparty elections). In addition, in 2004 
Indonesia began direct presidential elections, whereas previously a legislature controlled by Suharto 
had elected the president. Joe Cochrane, In Southeast Asia, Indonesia Is an Unlikely Role Model for 
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/in-
southeast-asia-indonesia-becomes-a-role-model-for-democracy.html (quoting Marcus Mietzner, an 
Indonesia specialist at Australian National University). Indonesia experienced an almost unheard of 
peaceful democratic transfer of power when it elected Joko Widodo as the next president. Id. 
3  Id.; Melissa Crouch, Law Reform and Human Rights in Indonesia-Myanmar, 63 THE 
NEWSLETTER 7 (2012). 
4 Cochrane, supra note 2. 
5 See Suzannah Linton, Accounting for Atrocities in Indonesia, 10 SING. Y. B. INT’L L. & 
CONTRIBUTORS, 199, 199 (2006) (listing crimes against humanities in Jakarta, Aceh and Papua). 
6 Robert Cribb, Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–1966, 3 J. GENOCIDE RES. 219, 219, 233 (2001). 
7 TERESA BIRKS, NEGLECTED DUTY: PROVIDING COMPREHENSIVE PREPARATIONS TO THE 
INDONESIAN “1965 VICTIMS” OF STATE PERSECUTION 11 (Int’l Cent. for Transitional Justice, ed., 
2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Indonesia-Reparations-Victims-2006-
English.pdf. 
8 Peter Dale Scott, The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967, 58 PACIFIC 
AFFAIRS 239, 239 (1985) (quoting CIA, Director of Intelligence, Indonesia—1965: The Coup that 
Backfired, Report, p. 71) available at http://wvi.antenna.nl/eng/ic/pki/pds.html. 
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ago, there is an acute need for this atrocity to be formally adjudicated. 
Critics say that creating a tribunal to pin the blame on a few luckless 
scapegoats would not help the victims of the crimes or help Indonesia 
progress as a nation.9 However, establishing a court to examine those 
particular crimes against humanity would serve significant domestic and 
international interests.10  
In recent decades there has been a proliferation of international 
criminal courts.11 The most recent example of an international tribunal 
formed to investigate and prosecute war crimes and human rights 
violations is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the 
ECCC, or the Cambodian court). It was established in 2006, and 
although it has faced severe criticism, it has taken small, but important 
steps toward its particular goals, and the goals of every tribunal of its 
kind: to convict the perpetrators of egregious crimes against humanity, 
provide healing and reconciliation for victims, advance domestic legal 
capacity, and develop the international rule of law. 12  The ECCC 
incorporated many novel features into its structure, many of which have 
led to inefficiency, excessive expenditures, and subsequent criticism.13 
Notwithstanding its many struggles and failures, the ECCC is still an 
excellent experiment from which Indonesia could learn.  
Not only is the ECCC the most current experiment in international 
justice, but Cambodia’s situation also has striking similarities to that of 
Indonesia. They are both nations with weaker legal systems transitioning 
to democracy, and each faces the struggle of adjudicating mass human 
rights crimes that took place decades before. Using the ECCC as a model 
will help Indonesia avoid some of the mistakes and difficulties that have 
assailed the Cambodian court, while at the same time taking significant 
steps towards the protection of human rights and reconciliation of past 
grievances.  
 Although these particular atrocities in Indonesia happened fifty 
years ago, establishing an international court to begin addressing the 
crimes is an endeavor worth pursuing. This endeavor would likely have 
significant, positive ramifications both domestically and internationally. 
The best way to design this new court to achieve these outcomes would 																																								 																					
9 Linton, supra note 5, at 202. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003). 
7i8y12 Carla De Ycaza, Victor’s Justice in War Crimes Tribunals: A Study of the International 
Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda, 23 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 53–55 (2010) (outlining the goals of 
developing the international rule of law, prosecution of past crimes, and reconciliation); Dickinson, 
supra note 11, at 304 (indicating the importance of capacity-building). 
13 Peter Maguire, Cambodia’s Troubled Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/opinion/29iht-edmaguire.html (referring to the “massive 
budget overruns” and “conspicuously slow pace” of the court). 
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be to examine the ECCC, model its successes, and avoid its failures. 
Though Indonesia faces its own unique difficulties, its situation shares 
key similarities with that of Cambodia. Learning from and altering the 
model of the ECCC to implement its own court system would help 
Indonesia address these mass human rights violations, vindicate its 
victims, improve its own legal system, as well as help shape the 
development of the international rule of law. 
Indonesia faces many obstacles before it can even come close to 
implementing a court system like the ECCC. It would have to secure 
public support and institute major reforms of the military, judiciary, 
police, and Attorney General’s office.14 Further, evidence suggests that 
the Indonesian government would resist any sort of international 
intrusion into its governance. 15  As necessary prerequisites to the 
establishment of a court system, these steps deserve our attention and 
examination. However, they go beyond the scope of this Comment and 
will not be formally addressed.  
Part II of this Comment will examine a brief history of the 1965 
incident, relevant developments since that time, and the current political 
atmosphere in Indonesia. Part III will address why these particular 
crimes need adjudication, and specifically why an international hybrid 
tribunal is the best forum for their adjudication. It will focus on the 
important ramifications of such a court on both the domestic and 
international levels. Part IV will address how Indonesia should approach 
the establishment of an international tribunal, in part by presenting a case 
study of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Part V 
will explain how Indonesia should alter the Cambodian model to 
implement an effective tribunal of its own. 
 
II. BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT ATMOSPHERE 
 
A failed military coup in the fall of 1965 set off the killings and other 
atrocities that occurred in 1965 and 1966 in Indonesia.16 At that time, 																																								 																					
14 Linton, supra note 5, at 203 (listing these things as obstacles to be overcome before efforts to 
secure accountability in Indonesia will be successful); id. at 205–06 (discussing judicial corruption 
and the legal system). The Attorney General’s Office has specifically resisted the investigation and 
prosecution of the 1965–66 killings. See Information and Documentation on Impunity in Indonesia, 
STOP IMPUNITY! (Oct. 31 2013), http://www.stopimpunity.org/page45.php. The National 
Commission of Human Rights in Indonesia (Komnas HAM) can only follow up by requesting a 
report of the investigation from the Attorney General’s office. Other forms of recourse are 
unavailable. Id. 
15 In East Timor, an ad hoc court was established to address human rights violations over the 
resistance of Indonesia, and only because of constant International pressure. Linton, supra note 5, at 
207, 218. 
16 Cribb, supra note 6, at 231–33. Though the coup happened “early in the morning of October 
1,” id. at 231, it is commonly called the 30 September Movement, and said to have occurred on 
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President Sukarno led the country and the military held significant 
power.17  The Communist Party or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), 
however, was gaining power under Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” 
regime.18 The party already claimed three million members at that time, 
and it continued to gain new support when Indonesia experienced a 
severe economic downturn.19 In the early morning of October 1, troops 
raided the houses of several anti-communist generals.20 Three were shot 
in their homes; three were taken to an Air Force base and later killed.21 
The coup was poorly planned, and the army was able to end it within a 
few days.22 While the issue remains highly contested,23 the PKI was 
ultimately blamed for the uprising.24 Wild rumors and propaganda were 
spread about the party, demonizing them and turning the entire nation 
against them.25  
In response to the public fear and outcry against the “Communist” 
coup, Suharto, a rising political and military leader, and current 
Lieutenant-General in the army’s Strategic Reserve,26 was given the 
authority to take “any steps necessary” to eliminate the PKI.27 To achieve 
this goal, the military sanctioned the killing of Communists in any part of 
Indonesia.28 While the military sometimes took the lead role in the 
killings, they commonly enlisted and provided local militias (mostly 
consisting of local youth groups) to hunt out and eliminate party 
affiliates.29 Sometimes entire villages were wiped out.30  
																																								 																																								 																																								 																
September 30. See Sara Schonhardt, Veil of Silence Lifted in Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/asia/veil-of-silence-lifted-in-; BIRKS, supra note 7, at 9. 
17 Cribb, supra note 6, at 229 (describing the strength of the army in government positions and 
access to weapons). 
18 “To most observers there appeared no doubt that the main beneficiary of Guided Democracy 
was the Indonesian Communist Party.” Id.; see also id. at 229–31 (outlining Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy). 
19 Id. at 229–30 (detailing the economic decline). 
20 Id. at 231. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Several theories surround who might be behind the Coup, some of which implicate Sukarno 
and Suharto besides the PKI. Id. at 231–32 (“Both the Communist Party and Sukarno had good 
reason to want the removal of the high command. . . . Also possible is that the coup was to some 
extent prompted or planned by the enemies of Sukarno and the communists in order to compromise 
them. There is inconclusive but not entirely negligible evidence implicating both Suharto and the 
American Central Intelligence Agency in this respect.”); see generally W.F. Wertheim, Whose Plot? 
– New Light on the 1965 Events, 9 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 197 (1979). 
24 Cribb, supra note 6, at 232. 
25 For more specific details, see id. at 232. Besides the cruel September 30 killings, the PKI 
were also blamed for the economic crisis. Id. 
26 Id. at 231. 
27 BIRKS, supra note 7, at 10. 
28 Cribb, supra note 6, at 233. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
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Estimates of how many people were killed vary widely, ranging 
between hundreds of thousands and a million.31 However, over a million 
more were arrested and detained without trial; those detained were 
questioned, beaten, tortured, and raped; some were detained for up to 
fourteen years. 32 The military and local militias targeted not only people 
labeled as Communists, but also those directly, filially, or only loosely 
connected to the PKI.33 Only 767 of these Communist affiliates were 
actually convicted of a crime.34 Anyone classified as a Communist, or 
having a broadly defined “relationship” with the party, was stigmatized, 
denied the right to vote, and could not join the military or become a civil 
servant.35  
Although these events took place more than fifty years ago, they are 
still pervasively influential in Indonesia,36 and the victims and their 
families still feel the effects.37 As of 2006, the military formally warned 
the House of Representatives in Indonesia that sympathizers of the PKI 
had infiltrated the House, implicating those who had “filial links” with 
1965 detainees,38 and the government still requires school textbooks to 
implicate the PKI when discussing the attempted coup of 1965.39 
People in Indonesia rarely discuss these historical events involving 
the PKI. However, people have recently begun to break the silence and 
open up a dialogue about their difficult history.40 This discussion has 
taken place in books and documentaries exploring the experience of 
victims and questioning the actions of the leaders who still remain in 
power today.41 In 2012, Indonesia’s National Commission on Human 
Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, or Komnas HAM) 																																								 																					
31 See id. generally. There are many different estimates from different sources. General Sarwo 
Edhie boasted up to three million had been killed; NGOs quote numbers up to one million. BIRKS, 
supra note 7, at 10. Komnas HAM reported 1.5 million people killed. AGO Rejects Komnas HAM 
Report on 1965 Massacres, JAKARTA GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2012, available at 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/ago-rejects-komnas-ham-report-on-1965-massacres/. 
32 BIRKS, supra note 7, at 11. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Id. at 12. 
35 Id. at 16–17. 
36 See Schonhardt, supra note 16. 
37 As recently as the nineties, 1965 victims were disenfranchised. BIRKS, supra note 7, at 17 
(“In addition, the 1965 victims were prevented from voting or standing for any legislative positions, 
including local, regional, and national elections.”). In 2006, there were warnings that the House of 
Representatives had been “infiltrated by sympathizers of the PKI.” Id. at 26–27. (“These accusations 
seem intended to target those members of parliament that have or are said to have filial links with ex 
1965 political detainees based on the argument that you can’t guarantee that a child has broken away 
from the ideology of his/her parents and that at the very least they have a historical grudge.”) 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
38 Id. at 26–27. 
39 Schonhardt, supra note 16. 
40 Id. 
41 See id.; “Breaking the Silence,” by Putu Oka Sukanta, published in March 2014. “The Act of 
Killing,” a documentary about the events, was released in 2012. The feature film “Seng Penari” was 
released in 2011. 
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conducted an in-depth, three-year investigation into the acts against the 
PKI, declaring them a major abuse of human rights, and submitting an 
850-page report to Indonesia’s Attorney General, urging an 
investigation.42 Although the Attorney General claimed that the evidence 
that Komnas HAM submitted was insufficient and refused to conduct an 
independent investigation, 43  Komnas HAM’s actions show that the 
events of 1965 and 1966 may still be present in the mind and culture of 
Indonesians. 
 The current political situation in Indonesia provides an opportune 
time to reopen investigation and to adjudicate these events. This year, 
Indonesians democratically elected Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as their new 
president. 44  His victory is a significant triumph for democracy in 
Indonesia, since the power of the presidency transferred to the opposing 
political party, and since Jokowi became the first president who did not 
have significant ties to the former government under Suharto.45 This 
could prove useful for a few reasons. Jokowi could use some of the 
political momentum of the democratic transfer to address the human 
rights tragedies in Indonesia, increasing the legitimacy of Indonesia in 
the international sphere by showing that the “new” Indonesian 
government does not stand for these crimes against humanity. Also, 
because Jokowi appears to be more removed from the old government 
and Suharto’s New Order,46 the extra distance might prove insulation 
enough to implicate those who held power during that regime.  
 
III. A NEED FOR ADJUDICATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 
 
Many human rights abuses have occurred in Indonesia that demand 
redress, some of which have taken place recently and could be more 
easily addressed than the mass killings of 1965–66.47 However, these 
mass killings may be the best place to start. This remains one of the most 
horrible massacres in Indonesia’s history; in terms of numbers it has had 
the most far-reaching effects. Arguably these events still impact millions 
																																								 																					
42  Margareth S. Aritonang, Komnas HAM Declares 1965 Purge a Gross Human Rights 
Violation, JAKARTA POST, July, 23, 2012, available at 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/23/komnas-ham-declares-1965-purge-a-gross-human-
rights-violation.html. 
43 AGO Rejects Komnas HAM Report on 1965 Massacres, supra note 31. 
44 Cochrane, supra note 2. 
45 Since the transition from the Suharto regime, the last four presidents have all had significant 
ties to the government under Suharto. Aspinall, supra note 1, at 21. Jokowi, on the other hand, was 
not tied to the Suharto era, or to the military. Cochrane, supra note 2. See also Competing Visions, 
THE ECONOMIST, July 5, 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21606285-
political-naif-represents-more-hopeful-future-indonesia-suharto-era (“[Jokowi] is not from the usual 
clutch of political and business dynasties and their sleazy cronies.”). 
46 Cochrane, supra note 2. 
47 See Linton, supra note 5. 
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of people.48 The fact that discussion of the issue still continues shows 
that although it took place decades ago, it is still potently present in the 
lives of Indonesians. The amount of effort and time that went into the 
Komnas Ham report also shows the importance that Indonesians place on 
addressing the issue. In addition, starting with this event could help set in 
place a culture of adjudication that would be beneficial to the redress of 
other, more recent crimes. 
It is also important to approach these issues on an international level, 
for example, by implementing an international tribunal. The worth of an 
international tribunal is not especially evident when viewed from a 
monetary standpoint. For example, the ECCC has spent $204.6 million 
as of 2013, and only prosecuted a handful of people.49 Other international 
courts do not have a better track record; the cost per indictment at the 
ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), 
ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), and ICC 
(International Criminal Court) was $11.2 million, $18.5 million, and $39 
million, respectively.50 But the value of a court cannot be boiled down to 
a dollar sign. Even if only a few people are convicted, the mere 
establishment of a court has far-reaching influences. It helps a country 
reconcile with a difficult part of its history; it helps with victim 
vindication and healing.51 It could specifically help Indonesia obtain 
legitimacy in the international community, take steps toward 
democratization,52  and investigate and prosecute other human rights 
violations. Perhaps most importantly, however, the use of an 
international tribunal to adjudicate these crimes could have significant 
consequences for the international community and the development of 
the international rule of law. 
Indonesia’s use of an international tribunal to address human rights 
violations will help develop international law to more clearly define 
specific crimes and to facilitate the adjudication of like crimes in the 																																								 																					
48 An overwhelming 1.7 million people were detained. BIRKS, supra note 7, at 11. Also, 
Suharto passed broad classifications that denied political and other rights of people only loosely 
connected with the PKI. Id. at 15–17. 
49 ECCC at a Glance, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, (Apr. 
2014), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20-%20EN%20-
%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf. 
50 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1031 (2d ed. 
2012). 
51 Seeta Scully, Judging the Successes and Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers of the 
Courts of Cambodia, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 300, 303 (2011) (“There are two general schools 
of thought concerning the primary purpose of international tribunals: tribunals as vindication of 
human rights, and tribunals as social healing.”) (emphasis omitted).  
52 Establishing the rule of law in Indonesia, as well as accounting for violations of human 
rights, will help Indonesia in the path to democracy. Matthew Draper, Note, Justice as a Building 
Block of Democracy in Transitional Societies: The Case of Indonesia, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
391, 391, 393 (2002); Jared Levinson, Indonesia’s Odyssey: A Nation’s Long, Perilous Journey to 
the Rule of Law and Democracy, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 103, 103 (2001). 
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future. In particular, an international tribunal could substantially expand 
the definition of genocide. Genocide, as currently defined by the 1948 
UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, is 
“[committing an act] with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”53 This definition does not 
include classifications such as political affiliation or social class. This is 
meaningful, since so many of the massacres and killings that have 
occurred, including the one in Indonesia, are outside this definitional 
scope. A broadened meaning would further include the millions of deaths 
during The Great Leap Forward in China, as well as the political and 
social killings that took place in Russia.54 Currently, however, killings 
like these are not labeled as genocide, and thus do not receive the same 
recognition or moral condemnation.  
This disparate treatment could be because political affiliation is said 
to be a mutable trait, whereas the others are not. However, one could also 
argue that people have the ability to choose their religion, and that the 
fact that a choice is involved does not prevent killing on the basis of 
religion from being encompassed in the definition of genocide. A 
political affiliation is not so far off from a religious affiliation; both 
involve closely held beliefs, ideas, and associations. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights gives people the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience,55 opinion, expression, and peaceful assembly.56 This 
does not specify a freedom to affiliate with a particular group, but carves 
out enough space to accommodate that freedom.  
Furthermore, although social class is not completely immutable, it 
shares similar characteristics with ethnicity, race, and nationality, in that 
it is often an assigned group—a classification that is not easily altered. A 
foundational idea found in the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide is the importance of being free from the “risk of 
being killed by the state, and free[ ] from having your ‘group’ being the 
target of violence,”57  which should include political or social class 
affiliation.  
Precedent supports expanding the definition of genocide beyond the 
express stipulations of the Convention on Genocide. The ICTR qualified 																																								 																					
53 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 
2, Dec. 9, 1948 [hereinafter Convention on Genocide], available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf. 
54 See William Easterly et al., Development, Democracy, and Mass Killings, 11 J. ECON. 
GROWTH 129, 149, 152 (2006); DAVID SCOTT, CHINA STANDS UP: THE PRC AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 39 (Routledge, ed., 2007) (commenting on the number of deaths caused by 
the Great Leap Forward: “Social and class redistribution underpinned the internal radicalization 
sought by Moa’s Great Leap Forward.”). 
55 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 18 (U.N. Dec. 10, 1948), available 
at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18. 
56 Id. art. 19–20. 
57 Easterly, supra note 54, at 130. 
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rape and other forms of sexual violence as acts of genocide.58 Although 
the tribunal fit rape under Article 2 of the Convention on Genocide as an 
act “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,”59 
its classification significantly deviated from the typical definition of 
genocide60 and certainly paved the way for future courts to consider acts 
of sexual violence when adjudicating genocide. This is a good example 
of how an international tribunal had a palpable effect on the international 
rule of law and great influence over future mass crimes courts.  
Having a tribunal formally describe the mass killings of certain 
political affiliates as genocide is no further stretch than a tribunal 
including rape and sexual violence in the definition of genocide, and this 
definition would encompass acts of violence almost indistinguishable 
from those traditionally defined as genocide. Killing a group of people 
because of their ideology has the same resonation whether that ideology 
is political or religious.  
Defining these violent crimes as genocide has important 
ramifications. It would provide more vindication for victims, labeling the 
atrocity committed against them as universally condemnable. Having an 
international element in a mass crimes court will not only bring 
vindication to victims and help develop the domestic legal system, but it 
could have important ramifications in the international sphere as well. In 
this particular case, adjudication of the Indonesian mass killings could 
help expand the definition of genocide to include many atrocities almost 
indistinguishable from those already covered.  
 
IV. LEARNING FROM THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS  
IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 
 
In establishing an international tribunal, it would be helpful to 
closely examine the structure of the Cambodian court in order to form a 
well-structured, more efficient model tailored to Indonesia’s specific 
situation. Indonesia faces many of the same struggles as Cambodia, and 
Cambodia’s court structure is therefore a good starting point. For 
example, like Cambodia, a single leader in a despotic regime governed 
Indonesia.61 Both countries struggled to transition to a democratic state, 																																								 																					
58 Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 239, 
246–47 (2008). 
59 Id.; Convention on Genocide, supra note 53. 
60 Gallimore, supra note 58, at 246. 
61 See generally, Aspinall, supra note 1, at 20–22; BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, 
POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE (Yale University Press, ed., 
2014). 
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and both still have problems with governmental corruption.62 Strong 
military authorities have ruled each.63 The atrocities committed in both 
countries also have similarities. Hundreds of thousands of people were 
killed and detained, which left innumerable victims and suffering 
families.64 Lastly, in both cases, the events took place decades in the 
past.65 On the other hand, however, there are key differences between the 
two countries’ situations. In particular, Indonesia has asserted its 
sovereignty and resisted assistance from the international community, 
whereas Cambodia requested international support to help set up a war 
crimes tribunal. 66 Because of the similarities, Indonesia could use 
Cambodia’s ECCC as a model to structure its own court, but the 
differences between the countries would require significant changes in 
the model to accommodate Indonesia’s specific situation and better meet 
financial and efficiency goals. 
Cambodia established the ECCC in 2006 to address the egregious 
acts that took place during the Pol Pot era.67 In establishing the ECCC, 
Cambodia requested the assistance of the UN,68 though it expressed a 
desire to maintain sufficient domestic control over the proceedings.69 As 
one of the first of a new breed, the ECCC is structured as a hybrid court 
and implements many unique and innovative features.70 The court is split 
into distinct domestic and international sides; it has both domestic and 
international judges, co-prosecutors, and co-investigating judges.71 The 
funding scheme is also divided.72 A “supermajority,” meaning a majority 
vote that includes at least one international judge, is needed to secure 
some judgments.73 The ECCC also has an ambitious civil participation 																																								 																					
62 See infra notes 152, 154–55. 
63  Helen Fein, Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State 
Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and Indonesia, 1965 to 1966, 35 COMP. STUD. 
SOC’Y & HIST. 796, 813 (1993) (highlighting the “coming to power of military leaders in the name 
of the revolution, or for the defense against the revolution”). 
64 See supra note 31 
65 The Indonesian incident took place from 1965–66, almost fifty years ago. The Cambodian 
killings took place from 1975–1979. See ECCC at a Glance, supra note 49. 
66 See Linton, supra note 5. 
67 Introduction to the ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/introduction (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
68 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning 
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, UN – Cambodia, June 6, 2003, G.A. Res. 57/228(B) [hereinafter UN Cambodian 
Agreement]. 
69 John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Experiments in International Criminal Justice: Lessons 
from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 369, 415 (2014) (discussing the Cambodian 
Government’s resistance of international control). 
70 Id. at 371. 
71 Id. at 372, 374. 
72 Id. at 407. 
73 Any decision of the Pre-Trial court requires an affirmative four out of five votes. In the Trial 
Chamber, a guilty verdict requires four out of five votes, and an affirmative decision in the Supreme 
Court Chamber requires five out of seven votes. Judicial Chambers, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 
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system for victims.74 The court does have its critics, some of which claim 
that the ECCC is not a model to be cloned or that it is a mistake that 
should be avoided.75 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the ECCC has had 
material successes. It has investigated and prosecuted several individuals, 
developed notable jurisprudence, and connected thousands of victims to 
the proceedings.76  
Indonesia should specifically look to the Cambodian court for 
guidance when establishing its own court because Cambodia’s situation 
is much like that of Indonesia. Indonesia should examine the ECCC’s 
many innovative features to determine whether it could benefit 
Indonesia’s own international judicial system. By using this ready-made 
example from a country with many situational and cultural similarities, 
Indonesia would not have to start its design from scratch, and could 
improve upon the working, if inefficient, court design of the 
Cambodians. This Part will explore the court’s structure and innovations, 
and its successes and criticisms, in order to determine the best 
organization for Indonesia’s court. 
 
A. The Split Court 
 
The ECCC was joint-established by the Royal Cambodian 
Government and the UN, and it is located on-site in Cambodia.77 Like 
other international tribunals, it has both local and international personnel, 
and it applies a blend of domestic and international law.78 It is composed 
of a pre-trial chamber and a trial chamber, each with five judges, and a 
Supreme Court chamber with seven judges; it is the first tribunal that has 
a majority of domestic judges in each chamber.79 The ECCC employs 
both a Cambodian and international co-prosecutor and a co-investigating 
judge.80 It also has a split funding scheme with separate financial support 
for the domestic and international sides.81  These somewhat divisive 
features were designed to accommodate and respect Cambodian 
sovereignty.82 While the UN pressed for an international prosecutor and 
an international majority, the Royal Cambodian government wanted to 																																								 																																								 																																								 																
IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/judicial-chamber (last visited Apr. 9, 
2015). 
74 See generally Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 425–31. 
75 Id. at 437; see id. at 404 n.188. 
76 See generally id.; ECCC at a Glance, supra note 49. It is difficult to measure the successes 
(healing, closure, truth, reconciliation) of a mass crimes tribunal. See Maguire, supra note 13. 
77 UN Cambodian Agreement, supra note 68. 
78 See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 295; Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 369. 
79 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 372. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 372, 407. 
82 Id. at 372. 
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retain sufficient political control of the court.83 This is a legitimate 
concern, as mass crimes have significant domestic importance, and 
international courts can alienate locals from the process and 
proceedings.84 
The ECCC also implemented an ambitious outreach and victim 
participation program that mostly has included free transportation for 
hearings, public visits or other proceedings, as well as a civil party 
participation system. 85  These things have led to notable successes, 
including solid convictions and jurisprudence, positive capacity building, 
and significant local involvement in the proceedings.86 However, the 
ECCC is seriously deficient in both original design and implementation.  
 
B. Victim Participation 
 
Victim participation is an important part of the hybrid court, since it 
furthers an important interest in connecting locals to the criminal 
process.87 It also promotes individual and social healing.88 Though the 
ECCC did not have an explicit provision for victim outreach, it assigned 
the Public Affairs Section (PAS) and the Victim’s Unit outreach 
responsibilities.89 Funding and budget concerns limited the capabilities of 
these two offices. The PAS circulated written materials and published a 
website; however, much of that information has no ability to reach the 
illiterate or those living in the rural countryside.90 Regardless, the PAS’s 
efforts to connect locals—the victims and survivors—to the proceedings 
of the court generated great success: The ECCC constructed the largest 
public viewing gallery available at any mass crime tribunal and it 
provided free transportation to the court in order to encourage public 
visits.91 Members of the public can take part in a study tour or see the 
actual court proceedings.92  
The sheer number of participants has been unparalleled.93 In just 
2012 alone, nearly 100,000 people were estimated to have visited the 
																																								 																					
83 Id. 
84 Dickinson, supra note 11, at 302 (indicating that “the lack of connection to local populations 
has been problematic” in “purely international processes”). 
85 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 421, 426. 
86 Id. at 373; see generally id. at 380–77, 420–37. 
87 See id. at 420. 
88 See id. (“Victims can more easily observe or participate in the proceedings, which offer them 
an opportunity to engage in truth-telling, contribute to the search for justice, and otherwise seek 
empowerment and a degree of personal and collective reconciliation.”). 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 421. 
91 Id. at 421–22. 
92 See Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 422. 
93 ECCC at a Glance, supra note 49. 
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court.94 The number of total visitors from 2009 to the present is estimated 
at 390,000.95 Of those who attended the trial hearings of Case 002,96 
eighty-three percent were Cambodians who used the free transportation 
provided.97 Although the number of local participants is impressive, 
some express doubts as to whether the participation actually leads to a 
deeper understanding of the court and what it is trying to accomplish.98 
Another important aspect of the ECCC’s victim participation is the 
capacity for victims to join a suit as a civil party.99 During Case 001, 
victims could submit complaints to the Co-Prosecutors and participate as 
full parties. 100  The Internal Rules were changed during Case 002, 
requiring victims to join a consolidated group represented by one 
national lawyer and one international lawyer, decreasing individual 
participation.101 In Case 002 the Pre-Trial Chamber initially admitted 
almost 4,000 civil participants, but only 750 were ultimately retained.102 
Reparations for the crimes were limited to those that are “collective and 
moral,” and initially should be borne by those convicted,103 but many of 
the requests in Case 001 were rejected because the accused was indigent, 
and the court could not support the reparations.104 In future cases, victim 
reparations will probably be supported by NGOs.105 
 
C. Jurisprudence and the Development of the Rule of Law 
 
Another praiseworthy success of the Cambodian court has been its 
development of solid jurisprudence. The Cambodian court faced many 
challenges, including political interference, a history of corruption and an 
underdeveloped legal system.106 In addition, the majority of domestic 																																								 																					
94 Id. (including study tours, court and VIP visits, video screenings, and school lectures in 
addition to public hearing participation). 
95 Id. (including study tours, court and VIP visits, video screenings, and school lectures in 
addition to public hearing participation). 
96 The Cambodian court’s caseload is divided up into four different cases, Cases 001, 002, 003, 
and 004. Case 001 ended in conviction in 2012. Case 002 was split into two parts; the first trial 
concluded in 2013, and the second trial began in 2014. Cases 003 and 004 are still in the judicial 
investigation phase. Id.; see also Thomas Fuller & Julia Wallace, 2 Khmer Rouge Leaders Are 
Convicted in Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/asia/decades-after-khmer-rouges-rule-2-senior-leaders-
are-convicted-in-cambodia.html. 
97 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 422. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 425. 
100 Id. at 426. 
101 Id. at 427. 
102 Id. at 429. 
103 Id. at 430. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 371. 
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judges left little room for UN control or guidance.107 However, the 
ECCC has shown its ability to confront difficult legal questions and to 
apply norms of international law to controversial issues.108  
There are several examples of sound jurisprudence by the ECCC; 
one of the most notable was the ECCC’s decision on the applicability of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability (JCE). The JCE is used to connect 
organizers and planners of crimes to those who executed the crimes for 
them, and it has three theories of accountability. The ECCC accepted the 
first two theories: JCE-1 (where the accused shares the intent to commit 
the crime within the court’s jurisdiction) and JCE-2 (where the accused 
has personal knowledge of ill-treatment and intent to further that 
system).109  But the more controversial JCE-3 (where the accused is 
responsible for acts outside the scope of the plan, but were foreseeable) 
was not accepted.110 The ECCC conducted a very comprehensive judicial 
analysis and found that JCE-3 did not exist in customary international 
law.111 Though this finding challenged an earlier ICTY case, it was based 
on solid reasoning.112 This decision, as well as two others like it that 
challenged national norms but provided sound and reasoned findings,113 
shows that the ECCC was able to tackle difficult issues and provide 
substantial evidence and reason to support its decision. This is a 
significant feat for a court that struggles with political interference and 
lacks a solid foundation in legal training.  
Even though these applications of JCE are not binding law outside of 
the ECCC’s jurisdiction, they still contribute to a lasting legacy of 
Cambodian and international law. The JCE-3 finding was the first to 
contradict the holding of the ICTY,114 and now that the existence of JCE-
3 in customary law has been questioned, investigations and discussions 
on the subject will have to tackle that contradiction. While the law on the 
subject was not changed by the ECCC, the ECCC’s ruling will have a 
direct impact on the law’s development going forward. These 
jurisprudential decisions were also the very first to challenge the norms 																																								 																					
107 Id. at 373. 
108 See id. at 380, 382. 
109 Id. at 381. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 381–82. 
113 The ECCC had two other good examples of sound jurisprudence. The first was a decision 
that found that Duch, the accused person in Case 001, had been illegally detained before the trial, 
and that this detention was a violation of his human rights. Id. at 382. One commenter observed that 
“[t]his sort of challenge is unprecedented in modern Cambodian history and a great victory for the 
rule of law.” Id. at 383. The other example came during the trial of Ieng Sary in Case 002. She had 
previously been domestically pardoned for her violation of human rights. The court closely 
examined the opinions of international, regional and state courts, and other human rights bodies, and 
determined that the domestic pardoning was not in accordance with customary international law and 
Cambodia’s treaty obligations. Id. at 384–86. 
114 Id. at 382. 
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laid out by domestic law, which is a victory for fair trials rights and the 
rule of law in Cambodia115 and sets a good precedent for other struggling 
judicial systems. 
 
D. Capacity Building 
 
Capacity building—promoting professional competence, legal 
reform, and a culture of respect for law, as well as leaving an 
informational legacy116—is one of the main potential benefits of a hybrid 
court.117  Although the ECCC was predicted to have notable legacy 
value,118 in reality, it has had little extra resources and time to dedicate to 
capacity building.119 Still, capacity building has occurred. 
The initial outline for the ECCC mentioned the training of local 
defense attorneys, but otherwise had no formal provision or structure for 
capacity building.120 Later, in 2010, the Legacy Advisory Group and a 
Legacy Secretariat were created, but they have remained mostly inactive 
and there is general confusion as to whether the domestic or international 
component has the responsibility or authority to take the lead on 
capacity-building activities.121 
Besides these obstacles, some capacity building has occurred, and 
many of the important effects of capacity building will still take place 
even though there is not a formal structure established. The ECCC has 
established a few training programs,122 but much of the capacity building 
has occurred through the interaction of domestic and international 
personnel, and the more important effects will be felt just by having a 
solid, positive example of a court in Cambodia.123 Many of the fair trial 
concepts the ECCC uses, including the presumption of innocence and 
clear legal justification for detention and sentencing, are not features of 
the Cambodian judicial system, and some expect them to trickle down to 
influence the local system.124 Some characteristics of the ECCC have 
already been implemented in certain local Cambodian courts. 125  In 																																								 																					
115 Id. at 383. 
116 Id. at 431. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 431–32. 
120 Id. at 432. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 434 (including internships, workshops, conferences, lectures, and training sessions 
with local prosecutors and defense attorneys, as well as outreach programs for law students). 
123 Id. at 433–35. 
124 Id. at 435. 
125 One of the Co-Investigating Judges, You Bunleng, also sits on the Cambodian Court of 
Appeals, and, due to his involvement with the ECCC, has made some changes to his own court 
system, including establishing a witness room and introducing a computerized case file system to 
help protect victims and the rights of the accused. Id. at 433–34. 
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addition, the locale of the court and the fact that proceedings take place 
in the Khmer language make ECCC law an extremely good resource for 
Cambodian law students and professionals.126 
 
E. Struggles of the ECCC 
 
Although positive results are coming from the ECCC, it has 
struggled with serious obstacles. Some are obstacles that any 
international-type tribunal faces, while others specifically come from the 
unique structure of the ECCC. Many of the problems originate from the 
split court structure and from the supermajority requirement. 
The split court structure has resulted in delay, deadlock, and much 
inefficiency. The process begins by preliminary submission from the Co-
Prosecutors (CPs), and an investigation by the Co-Investigating Judges 
(CIJs).127 Because of the double-headed offices, both processes were 
expected to take time; however, the CPs took one year to investigate the 
first five suspects before their submission, and the CIJs investigated their 
first subject for two years.128 Much time was wasted in this two-part 
investigation, with the different parties doubling each other’s work.129 
The inclusion of investigating judges was supposed to increase efficiency 
by providing in-depth evidence that would then be verified in a brief 
trial.130 Because this process works against the goals of a hybrid court, as 
a substantial benefit of a mass crimes tribunal is realized by retelling the 
story in a public forum and giving the public an eye into the proceedings. 
In practice, the ECCC has produced an in-depth investigation and a full-
length trial, undermining the original efficiency purposes of the CIJs.131 
The supermajority requirement was originally a prerequisite for UN 
participation.132 However, from the experience of the ECCC, it can lead 
to excessive delay and impasses.133 For example, when there is a dispute 
between the Co-Prosecutors or Co-Investigating Judges about whether an 
investigation should proceed, if there is no supermajority in the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, the investigation will presumably proceed. Even though in the 
case mentioned above there was a built-in procedure to overcome a 
supermajority deadlock, it still resulted in a one-year delay.134 Also, 
while the Trial Chamber can only convict a person with the vote of at 
least one international judge, there are no other guidelines given on how 																																								 																					
126 Id. at 437. 
127 ECCC at a Glance, supra note 49. 
128 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 375. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 376. 
131 Id. at 376–77. 
132 Id. at 403. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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to address other split decisions the court faces.135  With the current 
Cambodian court structure, there are multiple points for disagreement 
and deadlock, which have even proven to shield the decision makers 
from accountability.136 
The funding system also suffers because of the split court structure. 
Each side is in charge of providing funding for its own expenses, which 
has made the national side very vulnerable to underfunding.137 While 
other international tribunals are supported by contributions from the UN 
budget, the ECCC has relied mostly on funds from foreign donor 
contributions.138 Only seventeen percent of the ECCC’s national funding 
comes from the Cambodian Government.139  This has led to several 
funding crises as foreign suppliers have withheld funds because of 
disapproval of court developments, mostly from the side of the 
Cambodians. 140  As of 2013, the ECCC has already cost $204.6 
million,141 and while this amount is significantly lower than the cost of 
the ICTY or ICTR,142 the ECCC has cost more per case or individual 
indicted.143 The ECCC has also proven much more costly than was 
initially estimated ($56 million), and though it has secured many funds 
and has been a less-costly alternative to an international tribunal, it has 
still been plagued by inefficiencies from the structure of the court.144 
In sum, the Cambodian court was beleaguered by structural flaws, 
inefficiencies, and funding difficulties. Many of the novel features of the 
court, including the double team of prosecutors and investigating judges, 
the domestic majority and supermajority requirements, as well as the 
civil victim participation, contribute to unnecessary complications within 
the court. Many times this has resulted in duplicate work, deadlock, 
delays, or just ineffectiveness. However, the court has accomplished very 
notable things, and has done so in the face of the overwhelming domestic 
challenges of weak judicial and legal systems, rampant corruption and 
potential political interference, and financial stresses and burdens. The 
court has produced well-investigated, fair trial convictions of a number 																																								 																					
135 Id. at 405. 
136 Id. at 403. 
137 Id. at 418; see also David Scheffer, No Way to Fund a War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 28, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/opinion/Funding-Cambodias-War-
Crimes-Tribunal.html. 
138 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 418. 
139 Id. at 418. 
140 Id. 
141 ECCC at a Glance, supra note 49. 
142 The ICTY cost $2.3 billion to date and the ICTR $1.8 billion. Ciorciari & Heindel, supra 
note 69, at 417. 
143 Id. 
144 For example, the salaries of the national employees are experiencing “upward pressure” 
because of the salaries of the better-qualified, international personnel. Id. at 417. 
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of people. The court has been a solid example of legal jurisprudence, 
which is a shining beacon of hope to other struggling judicial systems, 
and which speaks well about the ability of a court to help contribute to 
the body of law in which it takes part. Finally, there has been a vast, 
unprecedented amount of victim participation, giving evidence to the 
idea that these undertakings will have palpable effects on those who 
suffered because of crimes, and on the Cambodian society in general.  
Mass crimes tribunals will fall short of the lofty goals allocated to 
them; they can attempt to reach a sort of justice, but in significant ways, 
their acts will never make up for the suffering, pain, loss of dignity, and 
deprivation of life. However, international tribunals, and the ECCC 
specifically, have still accomplished good things, taken small steps 
toward justice, and made important contributions to modern international 
law.145 
 
V. ESTABLISHING A TRIBUNAL IN INDONESIA 
 
Indonesia is a place where a mass crimes tribunal, if designed with 
proper structure and procedures, could make great progress towards 
adjudication and social healing. In order to avoid the pitfalls of the 
ECCC while capitalizing on its successes, the Indonesian court should be 
structured as an international hybrid court, with both domestic and 
international judges. It should retain domestic and international Co-
Prosecutors; however, the Investigating Judge should be from 
international personnel. In addition, there should be a majority of 
international judges in each court, but a modified supermajority rule, 
requiring at least one domestic and one international judge vote to 
proceed. Indonesia should also modify the victim participation scheme, 
eliminating civil party participation while still maintaining as much 
outreach and participation as possible. Lastly, Indonesia should use a 
funding scheme similar to the ECCC’s. This structure will overcome 
many of the efficiency struggles of the ECCC, but retain the 
opportunities for domestic growth, victim participation and development 
of good law.  
A. A Hybrid Court 
Although one of the main challenges to the efficiency of the ECCC 
is the division of the court along international and domestic lines, it is 
still very important that Indonesia establish a court with both domestic 
and international characteristics. This hybrid structure provides many of 
the same benefits as a fully international court, but it also enhances the 																																								 																					
145 See supra Part III for a discussion on how the ICTR changed what constituted genocide. 
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court’s legitimacy, gives more opportunity for capacity building, and is 
more affordable. 
Strictly international and strictly domestic courts both suffer from 
legitimacy problems. When dealing with mass crimes, these problems 
become even more acute. The atrocity of the crimes necessitates 
international adjudication and accountability, but domestically, the 
government and the public want to maintain some sort of control of the 
judicial process and the ensuing healing process. An exclusively 
international court will lack perceived legitimacy from the populace,146 
but an exclusively domestic court lacks legal legitimacy, especially in 
situations like Indonesia’s, where the international community is very 
dubious about the competence of the country’s legal system.147 
A hybrid court remedies both of these situations. It requires close 
collaboration between local and international authorities, and its on-site 
location is structured to instruct the public and involve victims. It also 
helps with judicial legitimacy in the eyes of the international community 
and in the eyes of the populace.148  Because Indonesia has resisted 
international influence in the past,149 and because the 1965 incident 
remains a very sensitive issue, with suspected perpetrators still holding 
positions of power,150 both the international and domestic aspects of a 
hybrid court are needed. 
Another asset of a hybrid court is its potential for capacity building, 
which cannot occur in an international court run solely by foreigners.151 
And with the challenges that face a justice system like Indonesia’s, a 
purely domestic court would not receive the international expertise and 
interchange that would help Indonesia’s system to progress. Furthermore, 
Indonesia’s judicial system faces similar problems to that of Cambodia. 
Corruption is rampant152—Cambodia and Indonesia have reported very 																																								 																					
146 Dickinson, supra note 11, at 302–303, 306 (Perceived legitimacy problems arose against the 
ICTY due to the lack of connection to local populace, and also during the East Timor court, when 
UN officials did not consult the local population about governance decisions.).  
147 In 2002, the United Nations Special Rapporteur said that Indonesia’s legal system was the 
worst he had ever seen. Linton, supra note 5, at 205. Also, in 2014, Indonesia was ranked as number 
107 out of 177 corrupt countries. Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/country/#IDN (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
148 Oftentimes this is most important when domestic adjudication could be seen as victor’s 
justice. See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 306. 
149 See Linton, supra note 5. 
150 THE ACT OF KILLING (Final Act for Real 2012). 
151 See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 304. 
152 Linton, supra note 5, at 205–06. Indonesia was ranked as number 107 out of 177 corrupt 
countries, and the public viewed the judiciary branch as the fourth most corrupt organization (after 
parliament, the police and political parties). Id.; Corruption by Country/Territory: Public Opinion, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L http://www.transparency.org/country/#IDN_PublicOpinion. (last visited Apr. 
9, 2015). Cambodia ranked as number 156 out of 177. Corruption by Country/Territory, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L http://www.transparency.org/country/#KHM (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
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similar judiciary bribe rates.153 They are also both trying to develop legal 
systems after the reign of despotic leaders.154 Similarly, both systems 
have been criticized for political interference.155 While Cambodia did not 
have a formal structure set up for capacity building, some still 
incidentally occurred, mostly because of the merging of domestic and 
international personnel.156  
In order to capitalize on this important benefit of hybrid courts, and 
in order to avoid the lack of responsibility and thus lack of action, 
Indonesia should appoint one international and one domestic director to 
head a capacity building project. This way, legacy work will be a priority 
and not just a by-product of the court. The legal reform that the court 
could accomplish could very well be the most lasting benefit to 
Indonesia’s political and judicial system. This appointment structure will 
clearly establish responsibility on both sides and avoid the confusion 
over accountability that the ECCC experienced.  
Aside from legitimacy and capacity building, a hybrid court also has 
the benefit of being more affordable.157 At first blush, this is not a 
strength of the ECCC, and admittedly, the Cambodian court costs much 
more than expected and more per conviction than other tribunals. 
However, the ECCC still functions millions and millions of dollars 
below the cost of the ICTY and the ICTR, and by implementing the 
structural changes suggested, an Indonesian court could come out with a 
much lower price tag. Generally, courts on-site are more cost-effective 
because investigations are less expensive, because there is closer access 
to witnesses and evidence, and because salaries for local personnel are 
typically much lower than those for higher qualified, international 
personnel.158 
 																																								 																					
153 Sixty-six percent of Indonesians admitted to paying a bribe to the judiciary in the last twelve 
months, extremely close to the sixty-five percent of Cambodians. Indonesia, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=indonesia (last visited Apr. 9, 2015); 
Cambodia, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=cambodia (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
154 See Fein, supra note 63, generally for brief histories of the Khmer Rouge and Sukarno 
regime. Cambodia’s establishment of the ECCC gives evidence of legal development. See supra Part 
I for evidence of Indonesia’s recent legal development. 
155  Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in Criminal 
Justice, 12 CRIM. L. F. 185, 188 (2001) (noting the “prevalence of corruption and political influence 
over the judiciary” in Cambodia); Gary Goodpastor, Law Reform in Developing Countries, 13 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 659, 671 n.17 (2003) (“Indonesians have a very low level of 
confidence in the integrity and competence of their judicial system. Corruption is rampant, decisions 
can be purchased, the courts are subject to political interference, and legal transparency is 
inadequate.”) (quoting Transforming the Legal System: From Rulers’ Law to Rule-of-Law, 1 VAN 
ZORGE REPORT ON INDONESIA 4 (2000)). 
156 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 432–33. 
157 “Hybrid courts were created in the hope that they would . . . deliver credible justice at a 
lower cost than fully international proceedings.” Id. at 370–71. 
158 See id. at 417. 
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	&	MANAGEMENT	REVIEW				 		VOLUME	11		
127		
B. A Semi-Split Structure 
 
Many of the inefficiencies of the ECCC can be chalked up to the 
double team of prosecutors and investigating judges, and to the majority 
of domestic judges sitting on the bench. 159  However, many of the 
benefits of a hybrid court (greater local control, interaction that produces 
capacity building, more effective social healing, etc.) would not be had 
if, in practice, the court functioned like a full international tribunal. In 
order to increase efficiency while still giving enough domestic control, 
Indonesia’s court should have the following key differences in structure.  
First, the domestic judge majority structure should be replaced by an 
international judge majority structure. The ECCC’s supermajority should 
also be modified to require the votes of one domestic judge and one 
international judge in most decisions, with ex ante procedures laid out in 
case of judicial deadlock. An international judge majority structure will 
promote judicial independence, as international judges can be chosen 
from a larger pool and have come from legal systems with histories of 
judicial independence and integrity. 160  Although this structure will 
detract from Indonesia’s control over the procedures, requiring both 
international and domestic votes will give back some domestic power 
while at the same time avoiding deadlocks like those that faced the 
ECCC. This lower bar for the supermajority, while easier to achieve, will 
undoubtedly still lead to many split courts. Indonesia should provide 
presumptions for such circumstances and give preemptive guidance to 
the judges about what should be done in case of an impasse. With these 
procedures in place, Indonesia can anticipate and prevent deadlock, 
maintain sufficient local control, and develop judicial legitimacy.  
Secondly, Indonesia should retain both domestic and international 
prosecutors, but retain only the international investigating judge and not 
the domestic investigating judge. This also strikes a balance between 
increasing the efficiency of the court while still preserving adequate 
domestic control. The ECCC’s CPs and CIJs received criticism for 
double work and inefficiency.161  However, progress is bound to be 
slower in a two-head office,162 and efficiency also needs to be balanced 
with the capacity-building benefits provided by such an integrated office. 
The greater burden on efficiency was the investigating judge (whose split 
decisions caused detrimental delays in the ECCC) and the general 
																																								 																					
159 See id. at 438. 
160 See id. 
161 See generally id. at 374–77. 
162 See id. at 378. 
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lengthiness of the process brought on by the bifurcated office.163 What is 
more, the prosecutors did not overly contribute to delays in the process, 
and in other courts foreign and domestic prosecutors have successfully 
worked together.164 Because of these things, Indonesia should institute 
two Co-Prosecutors, while having just one international Investigating 
Judge.  
 
C. Victim Involvement 
 
Victim participation is an important feature of the ECCC that the 
Indonesian court should not neglect. Participation helps victims to 
validate their suffering and it also allows for a cathartic release of hurt 
and pain.165 It has therapeutic value for an audience taking part in the 
story and validating the experience of the witness.166 The Cambodian 
court had unprecedented victim participation and observation, and it also 
provided the unique opportunity for victims to receive civil relief as part 
of the proceedings,167 to connect Cambodians to the process, and to help 
them toward closure and reconciliation. However, civil victim 
participation is not a realistic source of reconciliation in a mass crimes 
court. Only a fraction of those initially accepted as civil parties were 
ultimately admitted to the Cambodian court, and they were joined into a 
consolidated group and many did not receive the reparations they 
sought.168 This particular feature is not worth the cost or effort, when a 
simpler system of victim testimony and observation provides comparable 
social benefits. 
Indonesia, like Cambodia, needs to implement victim participation. 
Millions of people were directly affected by the brutalities that 
occurred,169 and there is still much cultural hostility toward the targeted 
groups.170 Having a public forum where the particular suffering of those 
people is vindicated would do much for their personal healing171 as well 
as help shift the overall public attitude toward those people and those 
events.172 Indonesia should remove the civil recovery aspect of victim 																																								 																					
163 See id. at 375 (showing that the joint work of foreign and domestic prosecutors enhanced 
the legitimacy of the East Timor court). 
164 Dickinson, supra note 11, at 307. 
165 Gallimore, supra note 58, at 257. 
166 Id. 
167 See Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 425. 
168 Id. at  427; “[O]ut of the 3,864 victims joined to the case, only about 750 were admitted.” 
Id. at 429 (discussing the number of victims admitted to Case 2 as a civil party). 
169 See Cribb, supra note 6. 
170 Textbooks are still governmentally required to implicate the PKI when discussing the events 
of September 30, 1965. Schonhardt, supra note 16. See generally supra notes 36–37. 
171 Gallimore, supra note 58, at 257. 
172 Erin Ann O’Hara & Sara Sun Beale, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth 
Commissions, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 125, 130 (explaining how truth and reconciliation 
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participation, and have a model closer to that of the ICC,173 where 
victims may apply to take part in the proceedings, may appoint legal 
representation, or may have it appointed to them. Through their legal 
counsel, the victims may participate in all stages of the proceedings by 
attending hearings and voicing their concerns directly to the judge 
deciding the course of action for investigation or in levying accusations 
against a defendant. While implementing this type of system, Indonesia 
should also replicate the impressive victim involvement of the ECCC, 
and provide ample opportunity for observation of proceedings. Progress 
toward reconciliation requires justice to be done and requires that it be 
seen being done. 174  Indonesia should also prioritize free public 
transportation for tours and study groups. Circulated materials and an 
informational website could potentially reach a high percentage of 
Indonesia’s people, as its literacy rate is notably higher than Cambodia’s. 
These things will provide the societal benefits of victim participation, 
while at the same time reducing cost and inefficiency by removing a 
resource-draining, ineffective civil relief system. 
 
D. Funding 
 
Indonesia should implement a funding system similar to Cambodia’s, 
split along domestic and international lines.175  Although Cambodia’s 
split-funding scheme led to several financial crises, it still managed to 
produce sufficient funds. The hybrid structure of the court helped secure 
contributions from donors who wanted to see the process continued.176 
The court is kept on a constant financial precipice and critics wonder if 
“donor’s fatigue” detracts from the work the court could accomplish.177 
But this system does provide another source of international oversight for 
the court. Also, if Indonesia designs a court with more international 
components, showing a willingness to concede on potentially 
problematic features, it could gain more legitimacy in the eyes of 
international contributors, and Indonesia might not have as difficult a 
time securing funds as Cambodia.  																																								 																																								 																																								 																
commissions can help change societal beliefs and attitudes by providing new information from a 
credible source). 
173  VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 10, 11, 16 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8FF91A2C-5274-4DCB-9CCE-
37273C5E9AB4/282477/160910VPRSBookletEnglish.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
174 Gallimore, supra note 58, at 262. 
175 Though the financial basis of a tribunal plays an integral part in its success, an in-depth 
financial analysis goes beyond the scope of this Comment, and so only the barest forms of a funding 
structure are laid out here.  
176 Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 69, at 418. 
177 Scheffer, supra note 136. 
SUMMER	2015																 											 									Neither	Forgive	Nor	Forget		
130	
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, there are many things that Indonesia could do to improve 
upon the model of the Cambodian court. However, it is almost 
impossible to predict a tribunal’s success from the outset, in part because 
defining the success of a court is not a simple task.178 Constructing a 
court from the Cambodia model then becomes a balancing test. It was 
easy to see, in hindsight, the weaknesses of the court’s structure, and 
these things should be taken in consideration of the particular goals, 
interests, and circumstances of Indonesia. 
The Cambodian court was plagued by inefficiencies and excessive 
expenditures, but it was able to produce good jurisprudence, thorough 
investigations and convictions, in the face of political interference and 
corruption. Many of the structural features of the Cambodian court came 
about because Cambodia wanted to maintain sufficient control over it.179 
Although Indonesia also has a strong interest in sovereignty and political 
independence, these interests need to be balanced, and some features 
need to be altered in order to avoid the weaknesses of the ECCC. 
Because of this, Indonesia should apply a more international design than 
that of Cambodia. The majority of judges should be international rather 
than domestic, and they should retain a semi-split court system with two 
prosecutors but only one international investigating judge. With these 
features, Indonesia will run a more efficient court, while at the same time 
gaining more legitimacy in the international community. Retaining part 
of the split court structure will also help with the interaction between 
domestic and international personnel, and the information sharing and 
capacity building that goes along with it. There are some features of the 
ECCC that Indonesia should strive to replicate. Victim participation is a 
vital component, and if any closure, reconciliation, and healing are to 
take place, it needs to be prioritized. Capacity building and the 
development of good jurisprudence will help the court to share its legacy 
with Indonesia’s domestic system, and the greater rule of law. 
Establishing a mass crimes tribunal is a colossal undertaking, and 
there are high stakes involved on all sides. The sheer egregiousness of 
the crimes calls out for attention from the international community, the 
local community, and the victims in particular, and there are significant 
considerations to balance while trying to serve the interests of these 
parties. An international tribunal has more far-reaching effects than 
merely bringing perpetrators of human rights crimes to justice. It can 																																								 																					
178 See Maguire, supra note 13 (discussing Cambodia’s claims that the ECCC would lead to 
healing, reconciliation and closure, and also noting the difficulties of measuring those kinds of 
goals). 
179 See Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 65. 
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bring individual and social healing through telling the story of the 
victims, thus bringing recognition and vindication of their pain and 
public condemnation upon the responsible parties. It can also bring social 
healing by publically acknowledging a crime that, especially in 
Indonesia’s case, for years continued undiscussed and its survivors 
stigmatized. A tribunal can also do much to help a country’s legitimacy 
and the development of its legal system. Taking the time, money, and 
effort to develop and implement a system shows acceptance of the 
international standard of human rights, and also proves a willingness and 
a devotion to that standard. Finally a tribunal is important on an 
international level. It helps with the development of the rule of law 
generally, by providing more defense of and advocacy for human rights, 
and can help in very specific ways, by redefining terms and eking out 
what the customary standards should be.  
A mass crimes tribunal is a worthwhile undertaking. There are things 
that take place in our world that should never happen in a humane 
society. Even though our ways of correcting these things, or just 
addressing them, are not perfect, they still need to be done. A tribunal is 
important in its own right, if only to assure humanity that we will 
undertake the impossible, because other atrocities deserve our attention. 
If we can make any small steps towards a better, more humane world, 
toward reconciliation for victims, and toward a better law for the future, 
then that is what we should do. 
